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I. Michael Heyman

A.

A Reprise on the Endangered Species Act
The ESA focuses on the listing of individual species. I think that it would be
wiser to focus instead on habitat supporting many species. This latter approach would
facilitate advanced land use planning rather than crisis management and would help
determine which species upon which to concentrate attention. It would also create an
opportuity to balance conservation and development in a more sensible way than
presently occurs. The present legal environment can make it exceedingly difficult to
take those actions that avoid serious equity impacts on private land owners and people
who rely on the resources of the public lands for their jobs and lifestyles. Moreover,
it would facilitate avoidance of taking claims.

A glance at the core process of the ESA illustrates that it calls for crisis
management. Most listings proceed from petitions filed with the Fish and Wildlife
Service of the Department of the Interior by individuals and organizations. The
Service carries on a biological investigation if a prima facie case seems evident on the
basis of information proffered by the applicant and it concludes whether the species is
on its last legs (endangered) or on its way there (threatened). If it concludes that
either is true, it is a Federal crime to "take" any of the species unless an exemption is
granted. "Take" is much broader than kill — it includes many acts detrimental to the
species although there is judicial conflict as to whether it precludes destruction of
critical habitat on private lands.

Ideally, as the Act is constructed, there would be prompt investigation on
every qualifying petition. Realistically, however, investigations can be costly and
time consuming and Fish and Wildlife’s budget is inadequate. At any time, therefore,
1

there are hundreds or perhaps thousands of candidate species awaiting processing
depending on how energized are petitioners. Undoubtedly, some species fail during
the wait. The Act provides no criteria for scheduling investigations and the Service’s
attempts to construct priority criteria have been less than satisfying and have differed
in various regions of the country.

Putting aside scheduling problems, in general the Act only comes into play
when a species is on the way out. The characteristic processes of the Act do not
anticipate potential troubles in the future.

The Act does not seek to preserve

ecosystems important to the sustenance of many species in order to prevent them from
becoming endangered or threatened. The bite of the Act comes later. Thus, a crisis
is at hand when the process begins.

There are two provisions in the ESA which seek to ameliorate collisions. One
involves public lands [section 7] where Federal land agencies (and private applicants
for permits on the public lands) can avoid criminal and civil penalties for "take" by
consulting with the Fish and Wildlife Service where actions might jeopardize the
continued existence of endangered or threatened species or destroy habitat critical to
their survival.1 If a project is contemplated, the proponent agency (or applicant) does
a biological assessment (a part of an environmental impact analysis). If in the
Service’s opinion the action or project can go forward as planned, or under added
terms and conditions, without jeopardizing the species’ survival, the action goes
forward. This is the usual result.

This public agency process helps moderate confrontations by formalizing a
reviewing process before the Agency makes irreversible or irretrievable commitments
of resources.

1 16 U.S.C. §1536.
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The reviewing process, however, even if well followed, is largely an exercise
of due diligence. It prevents inadvertent destruction of species. But it does not
provide direction well in advance of the intended action and hence does not articulate
a planning basis for land management. Moreover, even a good investigation does not
provide complete assurance for species not picked up in the assessment that might still
frustrate aspects of the desired project. This is less a problem in a legal sense on
public land than private, except where a permit holder’s investment is jeopardized.

The second process for ameliorating collisions is designed for the private land
owner. It is the conservation plan (usually dealing with habitat) that specifies how the
landowner plans to assure that contemplated development will not unduly impinge on
listed species. This might be by so designing the project that critical habitat is
preserved. This was the outcome in the first use of the process on San Bruno
Mountain in San Mateo County in California, which provided for the maintenance of
patches of habitat necessary for the survival of the Blue Mission butterfly. If the Fish
and Wildlife Service is satisfied, after public hearings, that any destruction of species
pursuant to the plan will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and
recovery of the species, the plan is approved and the applicant is exempted from
liability for incidental takes of the species.

The process is designed for large land developers —ones who likely have
enough land to devote to habitat protection, as well as development, and have the
funds necessary to carry on the required biological and planning studies and to pay
holding costs. Each conservation plan is specially sculpted. It is not a process that is
well adapted for the use of owners of small parcels.

B.

The Present ESA Processes and Property Rights
Before I explore what to me is a more ideal system for species protection —
one built on early planning - - I would like to take note of the property rights taking
3

arguments, many of which have been explored previously in this program, that have
been raised in the context of the Act.
The most extreme argument suggests that any meaningful diminution in land
value must be compensated. I cannot imagine that proponents of this position believe
it premised on a constitutional imperative. But it reflects a viewpoint of a number
gathered under the banner of "Wise Use" movement. They echo arguments made
during the post Civil War 19th Century and early 20th Century where any
impediment to market outcomes was viewed by some as constitutionally prohibited by
the Due Process and Contract clauses. Interestingly, while these views frustrated
such matters as child labor laws, they found no expression in cases involving laws
that affected land values by prohibiting particular uses. Prior to 1922, no Supreme
Court case found a taking of property rights in land by the exercise of regulatory
power. Physical invasion or acquisition of title were necessary. Typical of the
period was the First Justice Harlan’s rejection of claims in Mugler v. Kansas2 where
State enacted prohibition rendered valueless building and machinery used to produce
spirits. His grounds were broad:
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for
purposes that are declared . . . to be injurious to the health,
morals, and safety of the community, cannot . . . be deemed a
taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit.
Such legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or use
of his property for lawful purposes . . . but is only a declaration
by the State that its use by anyone, for certain forbidden
purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests."3

2 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
3 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887).
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These outcomes in both English and American Courts reflected a long history
of common law nuisance principles —both private and public -- which recognized the
innerconnectedness of land use and the propriety of judicial or legislative intervention
in protecting private parties and the public interest.

Two well known cases in the 1920’s provide today’s background for
evaluating the Wise Use argument. First was the Supreme Court decision in Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co.4 in 1926, (nearly 70 years ago) upholding a comprehensive
zoning ordinance against the attack that it improperly deprived landowners of
substantial value by prohibiting particular uses in particular zones. Since Euclid it is
well accepted that Americans who live in urban areas are permissibly subject to a
broad range of land use restrictions designed to protect and enhance the common
good.

There is no easily discernible reason why rural Americans are not similarly
vulnerable to regulations which reasonably restrain landowner discretion in order to
protect species of fish and wildlife. These arguably are simply rural manifestations of
the generally urban phenomena of zoning. I suspect that part of the problem is that
folk who live outside the exurban ring have considerably less familiarity with the
phenomena of zoning, and in any event are contemptuous of restraints on
individualism long ago accepted where populations are more dense and thus
conflicting.

The second case of importance was Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon5
which held, contrary to the prior cases, that regulation which deprived a landowner of
too much value would be viewed as a taking of property rights and thus
impermissible. This limitation, as spelled out in the recent case of Lucas v. South

4 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
5 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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Carolina Coastal Council.6 provides the most meaningful context for evaluating the
property taking issue under the ESA.

Mahon has been read by some to suggest other analytical obstacles.
Prominently it has been argued that regulation characterized as exacting benefits are
different than those preventing harm. Thus, for instance, regulation for the protection
of species, it is argued, is different than regulation fashioned to prevent inconsistent
uses such as a shopping center in a residential neighborhood; that the latter prevents
harmful use while the former — species protection -- exacts a benefit. This has been
one of the argued formulas to distinguish permissible regulation from unconstitutional
taking based in part on Mahon. The distinction, however, has rarely proved decisive.
The problem is, as stated by Justice Scalia in the Lucas case, that harm and benefit
are simply opposite sides of the same coin and defy rational analytic differentiation.
Thus regulation requiring the use of land within a zone only for industrial purposes
can be viewed either as preventing harms to industrial users created by proximate
location of residences peopled by those who might object to noise and congestion, or
a required dedication to a particular use because the city wants to attract revenues
and jobs. The same analysis, and confusion, attends exclusive agricultural zoning.
Most pertinently, wetlands regulation could be viewed as exacting a contribution of
desirable habitat for public purposes or as a means of prohibiting a landowner from
harming a vital ecosystem resource.

One of the most definitive rejections of harm-benefit distinctions arose in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York7 where the Court upheld landmark
regulation which prohibited owners of buildings classified as landmarks from
changing exteriors so long as the buildings produced a reasonable return in their
limited configuration. The argument was that such owners were being required to

6 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
7 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
6

forego economic opportunities afforded others in their area (e.g., greater height and
densities) simply to benefit the citizens of New York and that the latter might pay for
this benefit. The argument was rejected.

Property taking doctrine relevant to us is best expressed in the Lucas case. As
many of you know, Lucas involved the validity of South Carolina legislation
hypothesized for purposes of the decision to prohibit all uses of the complainant’s
parcel located on a barrier island. Justice Scalia for the Court said that such a
regulation amounted to a taking if it prohibited all reasonably productive uses, unless
all such prospective uses could be viewed as common law nuisances. The gravamen
of the decision, however, was not forced dedication of the parcel to public benefit,
but rather a pronouncement that regulation which sterilized land values by prohibiting
all "reasonable" economic uses was invalid, even if, to the chagrin of a number of us,
the reasonable economic uses were ecologically harmful. (Scalia refused to view
ecological harm as a common law nuisance.) The bottom line is that ecological
protection is a legitimate objective, but the regulation better leave the landowner with
some reasonable economic use. Reasonable is nowhere defined, but prior cases
suggest that devaluation can be substantial, but not close to total.

There is one problem suggested in cases prior to Lucas that still leaves
prediction uncertain. This is how to identify the property the value of which is
impacted. If I own one hundred acres and am asked to forego development of five
acres important as butterfly habitat, does a court focus on the five or the one hundred
in determining total deprivation? The distinction is crucial. In one analysis, I lose 5
percent of the value of 100 acres; in the latter 100 percent of the five acres. Most
cases suggest that the base for the calculation will be 100 acres. Otherwise, for
instance, conventional setback requirements would be constitutionally suspect.

The foregoing suggests the format for dealing with property taking claims
under the present case-by-case approach of the Endangered Species Act.
7

Larger developers should normally pose few problems. In most instances,
such developers can internalize the costs of creating and implementing conservation
plans and still have considerable value left. Either habitat can be set aside or
developers can mitigate by providing habitat elsewhere. So long as the Service avoids
undue delay, successful attack is doubtful.

That taking claims can be avoided, of course, does not assure developer
cooperation. Perhaps the most vexing problem involves certainty. Expensive
dedication or mitigation in return for a permit does not protect against the listing of
another species that will start the process all over again unless there has been total
buildout. In modem days of staged development, the risk can be significant.

Successful taking claims involving smaller land owners are more probable. It
is more likely, for instance, that all or a very large proportion of a small land owner’s
property will consist of critical habitat. Under the ESA, the Service can take into
account the economic impact of critical habitat designation on a landowner if
exclusion from critical habitat designation will not lead to the extinction of the species
in question. There is thus the possibility of an exemption (much like a zoning
variance) in many cases, but of course this does not shield the owner from liability
for "taking" the species.

Other ameliorating schemes are not feasible, however, under a case-by-case
approach. Considerable thought is being given these days to devices that spread out
burden and benefit of regulation to assure more equitable distribution of costs, even if
not required by the Fifth Amendment. One device, used successfully in the New
Jersey Pinelands, is transferable development rights. Unfortunately, however, the
case-by-case approach of the ESA, makes it impossible to use such an approach.

In the absence of a spread-out technique, and where "variances" are
impossible, it will probably be necessary to acquire the parcels of smaller owners.
8

Finding a source of funds is difficult and it is improbable that local levies will be
devoted to effectuate a purely Federal program. It is possible, of course, to liberalize
land exchange opportunities. Under present limitations, however, exchanges will
rarely be available. This will result in liberal use of exemptions and, where
possible, heavy reliance on public lands to carry the critical habitat burden and such a
result might be unwise as a matter of both biology and economics.

C.

Planning and Regulating in Advance: Management Techniques to Avoid Taking
Advance multispecies planning, as a substitute or compliment to the species by
species approach, solves a multitude of policy, planning, and legal problems inherent
in the ESA. An easy way to envisage how this would work is to imagine a county or
city general plan with a conservation element (perhaps combined with the open space
element) that identifies critical habitat for numbers of species. Imagine further that
the important habitat is defined on a regional ecosystem basis by a regional or State
agency under relevant statutory and regulatory guidelines. Further imagine an
implementation strategy for protecting the lands so identified in a systematic way.
Development would be permitted under rules that protect needed habitat or prohibited
completely in some areas. Finally, imagine review by the Federal Fish and Wildlife
Service which would be empowered to exempt the whole of the cooperating political
jurisdictions from species "taking" limitations for ten years or more, if it was satisfied
that the multispecies plan adequately protected presently listed species and nonlisted
candidate species waiting in the wings. Presume that the exemption could be ended
for substantial departures from the plan thus leaving the Service as a monitor, but not
a direct regulator.

Note how many problems of the Act are addressed by this approach. First the
approach ameliorates the problem of total species coverage by choosing out habitat
protection as the organizing principle for the application of regulation. Thus priority
is determined on the basis of "rich" habitat, the sustenance of which will seek to
assure survival of species before they need to be listed as well as listed ones. Of
9

course, some species will be lost by reliance on this process. But they are being lost
now because energy and money are limited and they are never reached under the
case-by-case approach.

Secondly, the approach also moderates the balancing problem by integrating
habitat conservation into a process where other needs are also portrayed. The
likelihood of making better accommodations between conservation and development
where all is being planned together is much greater than where species preservation is
a last-minute add on.

Finally, the approach also addresses notable legal and planning problems. It
creates geographic and temporal zones of relative certainty. If the conservation
element permits development in particular places, developers, local officials and
environmentalists know where these are. If the element prohibits development, or
conditions it under performance standards, another kind of certainty is created and the
market can adjust itself to the reality. Moreover, the very act of designation focuses
argument on the important values at stake and minimizes the probability of future
destructive change in the regulations. Advance planning helps avoid the collisions of
crisis management.

Advance designation also aids in the assessment of the costs of critical habitat
conservation and suggests means to minimize the need to acquire property into public
ownership. Also, by identifying properties which probably must be acquired, it arms
local conservancies with important information to guide their acquisition programs.
Additionally, "zoning" of this sort permits the designation of transfer zones for
purposes of establishing a market for development rights which will tend to minimize
acquisition requirements. Finally, advance designation gives time to organize those
institutions necessary to manage habitat and to determine the means for raising funds
to operate them.
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There is a serious limitation, as well as a heady opportunity, offered by the
multispecies planing approach. The limitation is that the Federal Government, alone,
cannot conceivably create and administer a land planning and regulation system on
private lands within the States. Even if constitutionally permissible, pervasive Federal
land planning and zoning is a political impossibility. The opportunity, however, is
that fashioning such a system would stimulate a creative federalism with States and
local governments playing a major role in both planning and management and with
the Federal role —with respect to private land — limited to setting standards and
monitoring performance. This is a much more salubrious role for Federal officials
than to be the equivalent of zoning administrators.

D.

A Test of the Approach -- in California
A major experiment towards these ends is occurring in Southern California in
a joint operation between State and Federal officials. The State mechanism is the
Natural Communities Conservation Planning Act which provides for regional planning
at an ecosystem level guided by the California Department of Fish and Game. NCCP
works in concert with the California Endangered Species Act —an Act quite similar
to the Federal version.

Under the NCCP, the State Department of Fish and Game enters into
agreements with local governments and private landowners for the preparation of
plans for management and conservation of multiple species, including ones in
jeopardy of extinction. The plans must be consistent with State guidelines and must
be approved by Fish and Game to be effective. Essentially they identify habitat
important to the sustenance of multiple species and establish rules designed to assure
continued sustenance. These might include limitations on development and actions
necessary to improve habitat. The plans cover public and private lands within
cooperating local jurisdictions, if the owners agree to such coverage. The inducement
for agreement is the State’s willingness to waive prohibitions against takings of
protected species on land covered by enforceable plans. The beauties of the approach
11

are twofold. First, the studies and planning ideally occur before particular
development is proposed. The approach is thus proactive, not reactive — much like
advance urban planning and zoning. Second, the approach is habitat oriented,
protects a multiplicity of species (including endangered ones), and reduces the
numbers of species that will become vulnerable to extinction thus minimizing
conflicts.

The California approach is being tested for the first time in Orange, Riverside,
and San Diego Counties. The Federal Government is an active participant in two
regards. It has joined the California effort by agreeing to permit incidental taking of
a threatened species under the Federal law — the gnatcatcher — on lands for which
NCCP plans have been approved. It has also provided appropriations to help fund the
scientific efforts that underlie the preparation of the plans.

The California approach addresses the three important needs I previously
identified: (1) It protects species before they are on their last legs. (2) Ideally, it acts
in advance of conflict and produces relative certainty as to what lands are and are not
sensitive for species protection, thus letting the market absorb the information and act
consistently. (3) It provides a rich opportunity for State/Federal interaction with local
folks doing land planning and regulation and Federal officials exercising oversight to
assure that these will protect endangered species. Moreover, it provides a good
model for national adoption which could be stimulated by modest amendments to the
Federal ESA.

This combined Federal/State approach is exactly what my boss — Bruce
Babbitt — applauds. In his words:
"The only effective way to protect endangered species is to plan
ahead to conserve the ecosystems upon which they depend. I
applaud the cooperative effort here to protect the gnatcatcher.
This may become an example of what must be done across the
country if we are to avoid the environmental and economic train
wrecks we’ve seen in the last decade."
12
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to 15. Unfortunately, the House has
failed to pass a counterpart bill, so we
have not been able to g o to conference.
My hope is that by attaching this
amendment to Safe D riv in g Water
Act reauthorization, we will be able to
conference a bill and enact it this year.
I would note that this amendment in
corporates S.171 as passed and amend
ed, so it includes all amendments, ex
cept one, that were offered and agreed
to last y ea r—amendments from Mem
bers from both sides of the aisle. The
only difference between this amend
ment and S. 171 as passed is th at I have
dropped Section 123—the Johnston risk
assessment provision. I have dropped
this provision because a Johnston-Bancus compromise on risk assessment has
already been debated and adopted as a
separate amendment to Safe Drinking
Water Act reauthorization.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
further debate on the amendment? If
not, the question is on agreeing to the
amendment of the Senator from Ohio.
The amendment (No. 1731) was agreed
to.
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I move to
reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. DOLE. I move to lay th at motion
on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
Mr. GLENN. I thank my distin
guished colleague from Arkansas very
much.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I see
the Senator from Kansas on the floor.
I wonder if we could enter into a time
agreement on this amendment.
Mr. DOLE. I am certainly willing to.
I would like to have the vote tomorrow
morning, if that is satisfactory with
the majority leader.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President. I sug
gest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
AMENDMENT NO. 1735 TO AMENDMENT NO. 1729

Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, what,
is the pending question?
The PRESIDING OFFICER The
pending question is amendment No.
1735 offered by the Senator from Ar
kansas.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I will
be as brief as I can.
What the Senator from Kansas has
done under his amendment is to say
that any Federal policy, regulation, or
proposed law that could diminish or
have the effect of not only taking
someone's property but diminishing
the value of their property would re
quire an agency analysis.
I will give you a classic case in point.
This is my substitute amendment to
the Dole amendment. Today, if the
Secretary of Agriculture were to pro

pose to the President o r the United
States that he limit durum wheat im
ports from- Canada into the United
States, under my amendment that
would not constitute a taking of any
body's property nor would it constitute
a diminution in the value of anybody's
property, and, therefore, the Depart
ment of Agriculture would not do, es
sentially, an Impact analysis.
Today, the Department of Agri
culture does an analysis If ft is likely
to lead to a taking. That is essentially
the difference in mine and Senator
Dole 's amendments. He says the De
partment of Agriculture most do an
analysis if it diminishes anybody's
property value.
Let us assume th at I am a pasta
manufacturer, that I make pasta. Let
us assume, further, that, by limiting
durum wheat imports from Canada,
durum wheat prices are going to go up
and, therefore, the cost of my product
is going to go up, and it could go up to
the point that it diminishes the value
of my pasta manufacturing facility, in
deed to the point that I might lose my
business. Under the Dole amendment,
if it diminishes the value of my prop
erty by one penny—one penny—I have
the right to demand th at the Deport
ment of Agriculture do an impact anal
ysis.
Mr. President, along with my staff,
we did a study of all the possible sce
narios we could think of. I want to ap
plaud the Senator from Kansas for of
fering an amendment on an issue that
is going to have to be dealt with. It is
a very important issue. When we con
sider the clean water bill here, we are
going to get back on this issue, 1 prom
ise you, because if the Corps of Engi
neers says that your land is now wet
lands and you were planning to build a
home on it, obviously there has been a
serious diminution in the value of your
property, at least for the purposes for
which you bought it. That would trig
ger an analysis under the Dole amend
ment.
As I said, under my amendment,
which essentially codifies the existing
law on it, the analysis would only be
done if a Federal action was likely to
lead to a taking—likely to lead to a
taking.
Mr. President, I am not going to be
labor this. I hope that every Senator,
when they come onto the floor, will un
derstand this. I think we are going to
voice vote this, and we will not have a
rollcall vote.
The other problem with the Dole
amendment is that it does not exempt
anybody. You could tie up emergency
aid for the Midwest during the floods;
you could tie up emergency aid for the
Los Angeles earthquake for years if our
efforts there to assist all of those peo
ple had the effect of diminishing the
value of anybody's property, say in Los
Angeles, by one penny. Nobody intends
that.
We have always—even the Reagan
order, I forget the number of it—the
executive order of Ronald Reagan ex
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empts law enforcement, exempts the
military, exempts foreign policy issues
.and initiatives. The Dole amendment
exempts nothing.
So, Mr. President, while 1 applaud
the Senator from Kansas for legiti
mately bringing to this body an issue
that is going to have to be dealt with,
in my opinion it would bring Govern
ment to an absolute standstill In this
country. I cannot overemphasize the
staggering, unbelievable, effect it
would have.
Having said all of that. Mr. Presi
dent, we are not going to have an ex
tended debate on this. I think the
-amendment is going to be accepted, so
I will yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER Is there
further debate on the pending amend
ment?
Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I sug
gest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER The
clerk will call the rolL.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the
roll.
Mr.. DOLE Mr. President, I ask unan
imous.consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER Without
objection, it is so ordered.
AMENDMENT NO. 1735. AS MODIFIED

Mr. DOLE Mr. President, I ask unan
imous consent that I may modify the
pending amendment, and I send a modi
fication to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the amendment is so modi
fied.
The amendment (No. 1735), as modi
fied, reads as follows:
Strike all after the first section heading
and insert the following:
fa) S hort T itle —This section may be
cited as the "Private Property Rights Act of
1994".
(b) F indings.—The Congress finds that—
(1) the protection of private property from
a taking by the Government without Just
compensation is an integral protection for
private citizens incorporated Into the Con
stitution by the Fifth Amendment and made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment; and
(2) Federal agencies should take Into con
sideration 'the impact of Governmental ac
tions on the use and ownership of private
property.
(c) P urpose .—The Congress, recognizing
the important role that the use and owner
ship o f private property plays In ensuring
the economic and social well being of the Na
tion, declares that the Federal Government
should protect the health, safety, and wel
fare of the public and, in doing so, to the ex
tent practicable, avoid takings of private
property.
(d ) D e f i n i t i o n s .— F o r
s e c t io n —

p u rp o ses

of

th is

(1) the term "agency" means an Executive
agency as defined under section 105 of title 5,
United States Code, and—
(A) includes the United States Postal Serv
ice; and
(B) does not include the General Account
ing Office; and
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2 the term “taking of private property”
means any -action whereby- private property
is taken in such a way as to .require com
pensation under the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
(e) P rivate P roperty T aking Impact
Analysis.—
(1) In general.—The Congress authorizes
and directs that, to the fullest extent
possible—
(A) the policies, regulations, and public
laws of the United States shall be inter
preted and administered in accordance with
the policies under this section; and
(B) all agencies of the Federal Government
shall complete a private property taking im
pact analysis before issuing or promulgating
any policy, regulation, proposed legislation,
or related agency action which is likely to
result in a taking of private property, except
that—
(i) this subparagraph shall not apply to—
(1) an action in which the power of eminent
domain is formally exercised;
(II) an action taken—
(aa) with respect to property held in trust
by the United States; or
(bb) in preparation for, or in connection
with, treaty negotiations with foreign na
tions;
(III) a law enforcement action, including
seizure, for a violation of law, of property for
forfeiture or as evidence in a criminal pro
ceeding;
(IV) a study or similar effort or planning
activity;
(V) a communication between an agency
and a State or local land-use planning agen
cy concerning a planned or proposed State or
local activity that regulates private prop
erty, regardless of whether the communica
tion is initiated by an agency or is. under
taken in response to an invitation by the
State or local authority;
(VI) the placement of a military facility or
a military activity involving the use of sole
ly Federal property; and
(VII) any military or foreign affairs func
tion (including a procurement function
under a military or foreign affairs Amotion),
but not including the civil works program of
the Army Corps of Engineers; and
(ii) in a case in which there is an imme
diate threat to health or safety that con
stitutes an emergency requiring immediate
response or the issuance of a regulation pur
suant to section 553(b)(B) of title 5, United
States Code, the taking impact analysis may
be completed after the emergency action is
carried out or the regulation is published.
(2) Content of analysis.—A private prop
erty taking impact analysis shall be a writ
ten statement that includes— .
(A) the specific purpose of the policy, regu
lation, proposal, recommendation, or related
agency action;
(B) an assessment of the likelihood that a
taking of private property will occur under
such policy, regulation, proposal, rec
ommendation, or related agency action;
(C) an evaluation of whether such policy,
regulation, proposal, recommendation, or re
lated agency action is likely to require com
pensation to private property owners;
(D) alternatives to the policy, regulation,
proposal, recommendation, or related agency
action that would achieve the intended pur
poses of the agency action and lessen the
likelihood that a taking of private property
will occur; and
(E) an estimate of the potential liability of
the Federal Government if the Government
is required to compensate a private property
owner.
(3) S ubmission to omb.—Each agency shall
provide an analysis required by this section
as part of any submission otherwise required
to be made to the O f f ic e o f M a n a g e m e n t a n d
(
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Budget in conjunction with the proposed reg
u lation .
(f) Guidance and ’ Reporting Require
ments.—
(1) Guidance.—The Attorney General shall
provide legal guidance in a tim ely manner,
in response to a request by an agency, to as
sist the agency in complying with this sec
tion.
(2) R eporting.—Not later than 1 year after
the date of enactment of this Act and a t the
end of each 1-year period thereafter, each
agency shall provide a report to the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget and
the Attorney General identifying each agen
cy action that has resulted in the prepara
tion of a taking impact analysis, the filing of
a taking claim, or an award of compensation
pursuant to the Just Compensation Clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
The Director of the Office of Management
and Budget and the Attorney General shall
publish in the Federal Register, on an annual
basis, a compilation of the reports of all
agencies made pursuant to this paragraph.
(f) Rules of Construction.—Nothing in
this section shall be construed to—
(1) lim it any right or remedy, or bar any
claim of any person relating to such person’s
property under any other law, including
claims made under section 1346 or 1402 of
title 28, United States Code, or chapter 91 of
title 28, United States Code; or
(2) constitute a conclusive determination
of the value of any property for purposes of
an appraisal for the acquisition of property,
.or for the determination of damages.
(g) S tatute of Limitations.—No action
may be filed in a court of the United States
to enforce the provisions of this -section on
or after the date occurring 6 years after the
date of the submission of the certification of
the applicable private property taking im
pact analysis with the Attorney General.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I might
just say a word before we adopt the
amendment.
I thank the Senator from Arkansas. I
think, as he properly indicated, this is
a matter that is going to be before the
Senate. We have not had the last word
on it, but I think we have made some
improvements.
I thank not only the Senator from
Arkansas, but the managers of the bill
and others on both sides who have an
interest in this particular legislation.
I think we should go ahead and act
on the amendment, and then I would
like to make a further statement be
fore we go out.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. For clar
ification, the modification by the Re
publican leader is to the second degree
amendment.
Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I am
not in favor of either of these amend
ments.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I
rise today to lend the strongest pos
sible support to the amendment offered
by the minority leader. Senator Dole.
There is no quarreling with the clear
words of the fifth amendment to the
Constitution: “Nor shall private prop
erty be taken for public use without
just compensation.” The debate has
been over precisely when a property
has been taken, and thus when to pro
vide just compensation.
It is one thing to recognize when the
Federal Government takes a property
by appropriation or p h ysical p o sses -

- sion. If what a Government policy, reg
ulation, proposal, recommendation, or
-other agency action does is to restrict f
one's use of property, there is a real
possibility of a taking by regulation.
This, it is quite another thing to recog
nize when there has been a regulatory
taking.
Since 1922 the courts have been
struggling with the concept of regu
latory taking. In the scattering of
cases over the last 50 years, the stand
ards for a regulatory taking have al
ways been ad hoc:
Since the 1970s, one decision after an
other has come from the courts on this
issue, creating an historic legal frame
work for the courts to decide future
cases within. But what is missing is
participation by the agencies in evalu
ating just when they have effected a
taking, and how much it will cost.
The National Park Service of the
United States is the envy of the world.
It is widely emulated in other countries. What we don't talk about very
much, and what we don't want the rest
of the world to emulate is the way we
deal with private property contained as
inholdings within the parks.
Over the years we have encumbered
millions of acres of private property
within the designated units of the Na
tional Park Service.
The record is replete with anecdotal
stories of the heavy handed actions
taken by the Government as they con
strain and control the otherwise lawful
actions of the private property owners;
that have through no fault of their own
become included within park service
units.
This country is founded on the
premise th a t private property rights
are valuable, and should be respected.
Yet what we have witnessed in the last
few years is the tyranny of the Federal
Government against the private prop
erty owner in the name of wetlands
rules, endangered species act regula
tions, and dozens of other Federal poli
cies, proposals, recommendations; and
other agency actions.
Over the past years thousands upon
thousands of individuals—private prop
erty owners—have had their rights di
minished by well-intentioned bureau
crats who have had no idea of what
wrath their rules have wrought. Nor
did they have any concept, idea, or
thought about the cost of the unfunded
liability the private property would
need to bear.
' ;
It is time for a little truth in adver
tising Mr. President—people need to
know how our laws and subsequent
rules and regulations are going to im
pact their basic constitutional rights."
Under this amendment, the Federal
Government would be required to ana
lyze the impact of their programs on
private property rights. Then, Mr.
President, we will have a measure of
the effect of agency actions on the use
and value of private property. The peo
ple will know, and we will have a clear
statement of whether the owner is en
titled to compensation.

